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a) Introduction  
 
Member States are to make civilian and military capabilities available to the EU for 
implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Yet, military assets 
can also be made available inside the EU under new specific legal bases for civil protection: 
the so-called Civil Protection Mechanism of Article 196 TFEU and the Solidarity Clause of 
Article 222 TFEU. The Solidarity Clause will be considered in more detail as part of this 
Foreign Policy Report. 
 
Article 196 TFEU 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a supporting competence in the area of civil protection 
under Article 6 TFEU. What is more, Title XXIII entitled Civil Protection provides a specific 
legal basis through Article 196 (1) TFEU which provides that „the Union shall encourage 
cooperation between Member States in order to improve the effectiveness of systems for 
preventing against natural or man-made disasters‟. Under Article 196 (2) TFEU, the 
European Parliament and the Council can establish supplementary measures to assist Member 
States achieving such objectives. The House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee‟s 
57
th
 Report provides a detailed assessment of Article 196 TFEU (pp64 onwards). 
 
Pre-Lisbon Council Decisions in the area of civil protection 
 
At the moment, there are two main Decisions covering prevention, preparedness and response 
which pre-date Article 196 TFEU. They were adopted under former general legal basis of 
Article 308 EC – now Article 352 TFEU. These are Decision 2007/162/EC on a Civil 
Protection Financial Instrument and Decision 2007/779/EC on Civil Protection Mechanism. 
The introduction of Article 196 TFEU provides a specific legal basis in the area of civil 
protection and therefore makes any future resort to Article 352 TFEU redundant. 
 
Article 222 TFEU 
 
The introduction of Article 222 TFEU constitutes a further development in the field of EU 
civil protection. The „solidarity clause‟ in Article 222 TFEU states that the EU and its 
Member States „shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity‟ and mobilise all available 
instruments to assist a Member State (at its request) in the event of a terrorist attack or a 
natural or man-made disaster. By contrast to Article 214 TFEU (external emergencies, re: 
humanitarian aid and relief for third countries – victims of natural or man-made disasters), 
Article 222 TFEU is addressing internal emergencies. It is also broader in scope in that, on 
top of natural or man-made disasters, it includes terrorist attacks.  
 
b) Origins and scope 
 
As it was the case with the majority of reforms proposed by the original EU Constitutional 
Treaty, the „solidarity clause‟ was carried over to the Treaty of Lisbon. Similar to Articles I-
43 and III-329 of the rejected EU Constitutional Treaty, Article 222 TFEU, which can be 
read in conjunction with the abovementioned Article 196 TFEU (cooperation between 
Member States), constitutes a soft mutual defence commitment for non-conventional threats 
to the Union‟s security and stability. Textually, Article 222 TFEU merges together Articles I-
43 and III-329 of the EU Constitutional Treaty and comprises what can be described as a 
verbose „solidarity‟ provision. It states that the EU and its Member States „shall act jointly in 
a spirit of solidarity‟ in order to address modern threats from non-state entities or natural or 
manmade disasters. Article 222 TFEU also provides for the mobilization of hard military 
resources in order to prevent such threats and protect and assist Member States at their 
request.  
 
c) Implementation 
 
The Commission has to put together a proposal for the implementation of the solidarity 
clause jointly with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The 
Council will then decide by qualified majority unless the decision in question involves the 
use of military resources or has defence implications, in which case unanimity applies.  
 
The competent authorities of the Member State concerned must immediately contact with the 
Commission's Emergency Response Centre (ERC) which will act as the initial single 24/7 
point of contact at service level for the Union. This is a new bodywhich will draw its 
membership from the Commission‟s Monitoring and Information Centre as well as its 
Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection. It is expected that the ERC 
will take the lead in coordinating the operational response and in producing joint situation 
assessment reports. 
 
Other actors in the process might involve the new (Article 71 TFEU) Standing Committee on 
Internal Security (COSI), which would assist the Council in the coordination of internal 
security operational actions (police and customs cooperation and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters) but would not be involved in the preparation of legislation or the operations 
themselves. Moreover, in the event of a military response, the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) would be authorized by the Council to take decisions related to the political 
control and strategic direction of the operation. In this case also, the Chairman of the PSC 
would participate in the Committee of Permanent Representatives II (COREPER II), which 
would be responsible for the preparation of legislative acts. The work of the Committee of 
Article Thirty Six (CATS), a Council working group made up of senior officials, would be 
crucial in coordinating the competent working groups in the field of police and judicial 
cooperation and to prepare the relevant work of COREPER II. Finally Eurojust, Europol and 
Frontex representatives would have the opportunity to attend COREPER‟s meetings.  
 
d) policy areas overlap 
 
In line with the Commission’s proposal for a Council Decision on the arrangements for the 
implementation of the solidarity clause,1 the arrangements for implementing the Solidarity 
Clause cover a wide number of policy areas and instruments. Inter alia, they include 
mechanisms and instruments enacted previously via Article 196 TFEU:  
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  the EU Internal Security Strategy  
 the EU Civil Protection Mechanism  
 Civil Protection Financial Instrument  
 the EU Solidarity Fund  
 the health security initiative for serious cross-border threats to health  
 crisis response and analysis structures in the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) 
 the Crisis Coordination Arrangements in the Council 
 
1. In what areas of global affairs does the EU add value or deliver impact or not on 
behalf of the UK?  
 
The EU has added value on behalf of the UK by: 
 
a) Widening the notion of security in Europe / broadening the notion of threat 
 
Recent natural and manmade disasters within and outside the territorial boundaries of the 
continent have generated a growing tendency within the EU to enhance its prevention, 
mitigation and response capabilities by using existing means and military capacities. As such, 
the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has seen European security law2 expanding 
beyond the margins of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The general 
provisions on the EU‟s external action elaborated in Article 21 TEU are extensive and 
encompass all areas of traditional foreign policy, putting emphasis on security, peace, conflict 
prevention and assistance in case of natural and man-made disasters. A glance at both Title V 
of the TEU and Title VII of the TFEU is sufficient to establish that the EU security model 
now encompasses a wide array of security policies: from military operations to civil 
cooperation and joint EU action in case of terrorist attacks suffered by Member States. One 
can therefore speak confidently of a slow convergence between the so-called Petersberg 
tasks3 and collective self-defence.4  
 
b) establishing a flexible response strategy against traditional and new threats 
 
Civil protection encompasses both traditional threats (e.g. marine pollution, floods, 
earthquakes) and new threats (e.g. terrorist attacks, global warming). Both types of threat, 
albeit natural or man-made, necessitate flexible response and robust planning capabilities. To 
avoid disparities in the coordination between national and EU activities, the European 
Commission has for some time now developed an integrated European civil protection 
strategy. A Civil Protection Mechanism, 5  an EU Solidarity Fund, 6  and a European civil 
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protection force (Europe Aid)7 have been set up to facilitate reinforced cooperation between 
the EU and the Member States in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major 
emergencies.  
 
c) creating a new competence to act in risk prevention 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon contains significant changes regarding civil protection that under 
Article 6 (f) TFEU provides the EU with supporting competence to act in risk prevention. 
This is reinforced in Article 196 TFEU where, inter alia, the EU has been charged with the 
task of assisting in the preparation and promotion of swift effective cooperative action 
between national civil protection services and to promote consistency in international 
activities. In this context, Article 222 TFEU would operate alongside Article 196 TFEU as a 
means of adopting civil protection legislation. Of course this new EU competence in the area 
of civil protection is complementary / supporting and, therefore, does not allow for any 
drastic changes in the way the UK has conducted policies within the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat. 
 
d) bridging civilian and military crisis management through ‘solidarity’ / ‘mutual aid’ 
 
Article 222 TFEU amplifies the principle of solidarity in EU law by making it an overarching 
principle, similar to that of mutual recognition. Contrary to mutual recognition, solidarity 
does not have an approximating character. Post-Lisbon, mutual solidarity manifests itself 
differently in a number of Treaty provisions stemming from immigration and financial 
assistance to energy and security.  
 
First, under Article 67 (2) TFEU, which aims at framing a common policy on asylum, 
immigration and external border control, the Union expresses solidarity through financial 
assistance to those Member States that apply the Schengen provisions on external borders and 
visa. Attention is also drawn to Article 80 TFEU which underlines that policies on border 
control, visa policy and the management of migration flows and their implementation ‘shall 
be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its 
financial implications, between the Member States‟. On a different note, Article 122 TFEU 
provides for financial assistance to a Member State that „is in difficulties or is seriously 
threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences 
beyond its control‟. The loose wording of Article 122 TFEU has allowed the EU Institutions 
to use it as a legal basis to set up the European Financial Stabilisation mechanism (EFSM).8 
What is more, Article 194 TFEU on EU policy on energy is intimately connected to climate 
change and allows action to be taken with the objective of promoting energy efficiency and 
energy saving as well as developing new and renewable forms of energy.  
 
In the area of security and defence, solidarity has acquired a new legal dimension, which not 
only has it consolidated the old collective defence provisions of the WEU and NATO 
Treaties but it has also formulated an EU response to events such as 9/11, the more recent 
terrorist bombings of Madrid and London, earthquakes and pandemics. In this regard the 
potential of Lisbon‟s „solidarity clause‟ expressed in Article 222 TFEU seems to add value on 
behalf of the UK. 
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2. What are the comparative advantages/disadvantages of working through the EU in 
the area you wish to comment on, rather than the UK working independently?  
 
Advantages 
 
a) Establishing a coherent EU response to emergencies / disasters 
 
Difficulties of multilateral cooperation among Member States demonstrate the need for EU-
level action and coordination to address disaster-related time-critical situations with a strong 
transnational or multinational component. Current bilateral / multilateral arrangements do not 
guarantee sufficient European assistance. On the other hand, purely domestic action by the 
UK cannot guarantee an effective, coherent and visible EU response to disasters.  
 
For instance, Article 222 TFEU addresses the threat scenarios listed in the 2003 European 
Security Strategy drafted by former High Representative Javier Solana.9 The Strategy lists the 
combating of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the fight against terrorism and 
organised crime, cyber security and energy security as high priority areas. Most significantly, 
at least for the sake of this report, the Strategy mentions that „the increasing convergence of 
European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more 
credible and effective actor.‟10  
 
What is more, Article 222 TFEU aims at boosting the role of the EU in crisis management by 
enhancing its response in situations equivalent to the „volcanic ash crisis‟ of April 2010 and 
pandemics such as the H1N1 swine flu which hit the continent in April 2009. In all those 
events it will be possible for the EU to activate its civil protection mechanism to deal with 
internal emergencies. This renders Article 222 TFEU a counterpart to Article 214 TFEU 
which addresses external emergencies. Contrary to Article 214 TFEU, Article 222 TFEU 
seems to be placing a lot more emphasis on prevention and protection than on assistance 
following a disaster. The European Parliament has, for instance, emphasised that an EU 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Action Plan would enable both the 
EU and its Member States to implement effectively the Article 222 TFEU solidarity clause in 
order to counter CBRN disasters, whether caused accidentally or intentionally.
11
 
 
c) Connecting internal and external security 
 
Working through the EU has provided a framework for connecting internal with external 
security. Internal security has, in recent years, become increasingly dependent on external 
security. For instance, the Stockholm Programme, which provided a roadmap for the new-
fangled Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, made explicit reference to Article 222 
TFEU.12 Under the broad headline „Political Priorities‟, the European Council highlighted the 
value of „an internal security strategy‟ as an essential tool for achieving the objective of a 
„Europe that protects‟ the lives and safety of its citizens. The Stockholm Programme also 
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considered the main aspects of such strategy comprising judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and the „solidarity clause‟.13  
 
b) maintaining national autonomy 
 
The TFEU makes clear that the principal responsibility for civil protection rests with the 
Member States, but provides that the EU has competence to „support, co-ordinate or 
supplement‟ their actions (Article 6 TFEU). As mentioned previously, the Treaty establishes 
a specific new legal base for civil protection (Article 196 TFEU) which may be used in 
conjunction with Article 222 TFEU. 
 
Moreover, Declaration No. 37 on Article 222 TFEU establishes that Member States are free 
to choose the most appropriate means to comply with their own solidarity obligation towards 
their counterparts. It would be up to them to decide how they would assist another Member 
State.
14
 
 
According to the Commission in its proposal for a Decision on the implementation of Article 
222 TFEU, ‘the EU should act only in exceptional circumstances and at the request of the 
political authorities of a Member State which sees its own capacities overwhelmed as the 
result of an actual or imminent terrorist attack or of a natural or man- made disaster.’ 
 
Disadvantages 
 
a) a political commitment 
 
Article 222 TFEU does not represent a clause on the defence of the EU‟s territorial integrity. 
Furthermore, the European Security Strategy is merely a policy document aimed at guiding 
the EU security strategy and not a means of providing EU Institutions with a direct mandate 
to develop defence policy instruments. Furthermore, the position taken in relation to 
mitigating or alleviating the damage following a disaster is unclear in Article 222 TFEU. To 
that effect the Council has stressed that „reinforcement of the Union‟s disaster response 
capacity should be achieved through a balanced approach guided by two principles: national 
responsibility and EU solidarity‟.15  
 
b) Legal substance problems  
 
Article 222 TFEU cannot be employed in its own as a legal basis for the development of new 
legislative proposals which aim at protecting civilian populations through cooperation. 
Proposals for EU-level action and for enabling a certain response are not sufficiently detailed 
to rule out future concerns over subsidiarity.  
 
c) Lack of implementation arrangements 
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The fact that that Member States are free to choose the most appropriate means to comply 
with their own solidarity obligation is important when one considers the possible legal 
implications arising from a breach of Article 222 TFEU. With all these factors in mind, in 
2010, the European Commission and the High Representative committed themselves to put 
together a proposal for the implementation arrangements of the Solidarity Clause within 
2011. 16  Furthermore, the Brussels European Council of 29 September 2011 prepared a 
number of questions for the Member States‟ delegations aimed inter alia at streamlining the 
debate on the scope of Article 222 TFEU and the role of the EU Institutions and the Member 
States in applying it.17 In its effort to give tangible expression to the principle of solidarity, 
the Presidency asked the following questions: 
 
How to assess that a Member State is “the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of 
a natural or man-made disaster”? Should the assessment be made by the Member 
State concerned or by other means? 
 
In which specific cases of Member States being “the object or victim” of an attack 
or a disaster should the obligation of solidarity apply? Could the concept of “being 
the object of an attack” be applied to preventive actions, before a terrorist attack has 
actually taken place? 
 
Therefore, could a definition be adopted that would cover cases in which the 
Solidarity Clause could be applied and which would prevent its application to minor 
events? Or perhaps an ad hoc assessment should be made? 
 
The Solidarity Clause underlines that its territorial application is limited to the 
territory of the Member State concerned. However, would it also apply if another 
EU Member State or a third country is the object of a terrorist attack by which the 
Member State invoking the Clause feels concerned as well? 
 
Finally, how do the Member States consider that the regular threat assessment 
would be carried out by the European Council? 
 
d) Lack of expertise 
 
While recognising the input of numerous actors in the implementation of Article 222 TFEU, 
it is argued that while the Commission's Emergency Response Centre (ERC) has the expertise 
to deal with the humanitarian aspect of civil protection, has no expertise over dealing with 
cases regarding terrorism. 
 
d) Mixing CFSP – TFEU objectives  
 
The nature of the objective of the Article 222 TFEU „soft‟ solidarity commitment is 
questionable. This is especially since Article 222 TFEU stretches beyond the CSDP by also 
engaging with non-military instruments. For instance, there is nothing in Article 222 TFEU 
which suggests that the „solidarity clause‟ extends to attacks carried out by state-sponsored 
terrorist groups (the so-called acts by legitimate liberation movements in Cuba, North Korea, 
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and Syria)18 or, so to call them, rogue states‟ attacks. In these situations, the former pillar 
demarcation that Lisbon has taken pride of dissolving is as relevant as ever. This is because 
the fight against terrorism seems to concern equally the CFSP (and, by extension, CSDP 
actions) and the Criminal law acquis of the Treaty (e.g. Article 75 TFEU on smart sanctions 
and Article 83 TFEU on the definition of criminal offences).  
 
3. How effective is the EU at combining its foreign, defence, economic and civil 
protection policy instruments to deliver best effect in foreign policy? What, if anything, 
should it do differently?  
 
4. How effective are the EU’s delivery mechanisms? Would any changes make them 
more effective, and if so, which ones and why?  
 
Article 222 TFEU has not yet been employed to be able to assess its effectiveness. 
 
5. Would a different division of EU and Member State competence in a particular area 
produce more effective policies? If so, how and why?  
 
The following issues need to be addressed / clarified: 
 
a) uncomfortable legal setting of Article 222 TFEU 
 
First, in terms of its legal geography in the Treaty of Lisbon, it is argued that Article 222 
TFEU sits, somewhat, in isolation.19 Perhaps this reflects the sentiment of the Treaty drafters 
that such a provision neither dovetails neatly with the European Union‟s external action (Part 
Five, TFEU) nor does it sit comfortably in Section 2 of the TEU (CSDP), for instance, as an 
inherent part of Article 42 (7) TEU, which encompasses the collective obligation of Member 
States to assist one of their counterparts in the event of attack on their territory by deploying 
their military assets. This, of course, seems to negate the reality being, in the words of a 
commentator, that „the terrorism dimension of [C]SDP is today fast becoming a permanent 
field of EU policy‟. 20  In other words, there is no obstacle in the TEU that would have 
prevented CSDP actions entailing the use of Member States‟ armed forces to realise soft 
security objectives within the EU in times of emergency. As a result, one finds it hard to 
rationalise the existence of a separate „solidarity‟ civil protection provision in the TFEU. This 
is especially since the implications of Article 222 TFEU for EU Institutions and Member 
States are yet to be fully clarified.  
 
b) CFSP – TFEU competence demarcation 
 
The dual EU commitment to „protect its citizens‟ (Article 3 (5) TEU) and to use CSDP tasks 
to achieve counter-terrorist objectives (Article 43 TEU) has added to the „fuzziness‟ of 
competence delimitation between those aspects of security tied within the TEU (CSDP) and 
those related to the TFEU (judicial cooperation in criminal matters). Some clarification is 
therefore necessary. 
 
More guidance is also needed with reference to the „solidarity clause‟ of Article 222 TFEU 
vis-à-vis the so-called „mutual defence clause‟ under Article 42 (7) TEU which comprises the 
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„EU version‟ of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 1949 (NATO) and Article V of the 
Modified Brussels Treaty 1949 (WEU).  The first paragraph of the Article reads as follows: 
 
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other 
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the 
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States. 
 
Perhaps a clearer demarcation of pillar-overarching areas would be desirable so that the 
competence under CFSP and TFEU would occupy different fields. For instance, Article 42 
(7) TEU could deal with state violence against one or more Member States and state-
sponsored terrorism through CSDP military means. On the other hand, Article 222 TFEU 
could focus on countering oppositional terrorism by non-state actors and serious crime 
through the EU Criminal law acquis. This leads us to the next section which studies the 
overlap between the TFEU „solidarity clause‟ and the TEU „collective defence clause‟. 
 
c) the relationship between Article 222 TFEU and Article 42 (7) TEU 
 
The military aspect of Lisbon‟s internal security commitments under Article 222 TFEU has 
enriched the CSDP. Considering the erosion of the schism between internal and external 
security, Article 222 TFEU could have been expressly mentioned in Article 42 (7) TEU. As 
argued previously „it is somewhat peculiar that this clause [on solidarity] is separated from 
the collective defence clause and is included in the TFEU (Art 222) rather than together with 
the [C]SDP provisions in the TEU.‟21 Evidently, the legal geography of Article 222 TFEU is 
atypical but this is not sufficient to argue that a separate „defence‟ clause was not necessary in 
the TFEU.  
 
Despite the confusing similarities between the „solidarity‟ and „mutual defence‟ clauses, there 
are certain fundamental differences which need to be clarified. On the one hand, Article 42 
(7) TEU applies only in cases of „armed aggression‟ against the territory of a Member State. 
As such, it constitutes in its entirety an intergovernmental device and does not foresee for the 
involvement of EU institutions by creating any sort of new supranational competences. 
Conversely, Article 222 TFEU requests Member States to coordinate between themselves in 
the Council and provides the EU with power to mobilize all instruments at its disposal in 
order to protect and assist Member States in the event of a terrorist attack, or natural or man-
made disaster. It is also argued that Article 222 TFEU can be used alongside other legal bases 
to justify new legislative acts that would presumably foster solidarity between Member States 
in the fight against serious crime and disaster response. Article 42 (7) TEU operates in 
isolation as a scheme which although reinforces the concept of self-defence in EU law, is, 
nonetheless, not conditioned by a predetermined minimum number of participant states.  
 
d) the lack of enforcement credibility 
 
These differences aside, both Article 222 TFEU and Article 42 (7) TEU suffer from lack of 
enforcement credibility. For instance although Member States are bound by the principle of 
sincere cooperation or loyalty under Article 4 (3) TEU to demonstrate solidarity to their 
counterparts, the present author predicts possible breaches of Article 222 TFEU and Article 
42 (7) TEU in view of certain Member States‟ half-hearted compliance with the 
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commitments inherent in the solidarity and mutual defence clauses. The present author 
proposes that the duty to aid and assist the Member State(s) concerned needs to be 
meticulously aligned to the principle of loyalty expressed in Article 4 (3) TEU. Such a 
clarification will seemingly motivate Member States to sincerely co-operate within the 
framework of the Union‟s security strategy whilst the Court of Justice will be invited to 
sanction their actions or omissions.  
 
6. How might the national interest be served by action being taken in this field at a 
different level e.g. regional, national, UN, NATO, OECD, G20 – either in addition or as 
an alternative to action at EU level?  
 
a) An add-on to national broader security commitments  
 
Both Article 222 TFEU and Article 42 (7) TEU „clauses‟ offer a joint commitment which 
goes beyond the NATO and WEU collective security provisions. Complementary to mutual 
cooperation in the case of an armed attack on one of the Member States, the Treaty of Lisbon 
has created a link between the CSDP and the external dimension of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice vis-à-vis improving security by controlling serious criminal threats, both 
inside and outside the European continent.22  
 
The similarities of Article 42 (7) TEU with Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington are obvious, 
although Article 42 (7) TEU does not explicitly mention „the use of armed force‟. What is 
more, contrary to NATO, the EU does not maintain strong military readiness structures or 
joint military planning. Thus, while such a military assistance obligation may at first glance 
be seen as a move towards EU military autonomy, a close reading of Article 42 (7) TEU puts 
into question the role of the EU as a „defence organisation‟. 23  Obviously EU defence 
cooperation capacities can change over time considering the potential of the European 
Defence Agency (Article 45 TEU) and the use of the newly-introduced permanent structured 
cooperation in security and defence policy (Article 42 (6) TEU) which features high among 
the Treaty of Lisbon provisions. Having said that, mutual assistance at EU level still has to be 
compromised with the broader security commitments of the Member States in NATO, 
especially those related to collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Washington Treaty 
1949. The second paragraph of Article 42 (7) TEU is more explicit about the NATO-EU 
relationship. It reads: 
 
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments 
under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are 
members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for 
its implementation. 
 
Hence, the clause‟s activation falls upon each Member State individually and does not 
depend on the EU as a whole. This is because Article 42 (7) TEU does not aim at transferring 
any competence upon the EU Institutions but rather creates responsibilities between Member 
States. Equally when it comes to the implementation of Article 42 (7) TEU, the EU 
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Institutions play no role since all relevant arrangements will have to be unanimously agreed 
among the Member States. As such, similar to the solidarity clause, when it comes to mutual 
assistance a lot depends on the Member States‟ political consensus, especially within non-
aligned countries, over the use of armed force under the EU banner.  
 
b) The necessity of regular threat assessment / list of incidents necessitating EU action 
 
The list of „threat scenarios‟ would need to be regularly updated through a threat assessment 
report put together by the European Council. This will determine the future use of the 
„clauses‟, which may - in some cases - involve a parallel activation of Article 42 (7) TEU and 
Article 222 TFEU in cases where the threat is ambiguous. This, however, may be seen as a 
weakness embedded in the clauses, which relates to their uncertain legal footing. In particular, 
the legal underpinnings of Article 222 TFEU, make one wonder whether in the absence of a 
solidarity provision in the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States would have still been able to 
make such an open, albeit vague, request for assistance.  
 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon „threat assessment‟ is carried out at political level through the 
European Council and not by specialist organisations such as Europol or agencies such as 
Frontex (border security). Additionally the clarification of Lisbon‟s sloppy implementation 
language regarding how national authorities need to take on board their solidarity obligations 
vis-à-vis an indicative list of incidents where they have to act jointly in a spirit of cooperation 
might be desirable. It is expected that from 2015 the Commission and the High 
Representative will regularly produce a joint EU threat and risk assessment report. 
 
7. Are there any general points you wish to make, which are not captured above?  
 
Very often the expression of solidarity under the Treaty of Lisbon concerns a reconciliation 
of the interests of those Member States seeking mutual solidarity by supporting the legal 
standing of Article 222 TFEU, those who wish to safeguard their neutral status in case 
solidarity mandates the use of force, and those seeking to ensure that committing themselves 
to EU security initiatives will not comprise an abuse of the „solidarity clause‟ which will 
compromise the status of NATO.  
 
The Commission‟s 2012 proposal for a Decision to implement Article 222 TFEU aims at 
establishing the necessary links between sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation 
functions (in the area of health, civil protection, nuclear risk monitoring, and terrorism) and 
utilizing EU-led operational initiatives. These efforts will presumably bring into the „civil 
protection equation‟ both EU agencies and the European External Action Service, which 
would in turn contribute to information sharing and threat/risk assessment reports. 24 The 
objective is to increase the EU resilience to crises and disasters so that by 2014 a coherent 
risk management policy would be established.25  
 
 
                                                 
24
 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, „The EU Internal Security 
Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe‟, Brussels, 22.11.2010, COM (2010) 673 final. 
25
 European Commission, „Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council‟, 
Brussels, 25.11.2011, COM (2011) 790 final. 
